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Where a corporation chartered and doing business in another State
sold goods in Texas, to be transferred and delivered to a person doing
business there, an "action for the price cannot be defeated on the ground
of the company's failure to comply with the statute requiring a foreign
corporation to file a copy of its articles with the Secretary of State of
Texas, since the transaction was an act of interstate commerce, and even
if the statute could be held applicable it would violate the commerce
clause of the Federal Constitution: Bateman v. Western Star Milling
Co., 2o S. W. Rep., 93!, followed.

Opinion by TARLTON, J.
THn RIGHT OF A NON-R SIDXNT To TRANSACT BusINEss IN A STATE.
The clauses of the National Conwhich provides that no State shall
stitution which are usually invoked
make or enforce any law which
to sustain this right are Article i,
shall abridge the privileges or im8, giving to Congress the right to
munities of citizens of the United
regulate commerce among the States.
several States, Article 4, 2, proIn Ward v. State of Maryland,
r2 Wall., 418, the plaintiff in error
viding that the citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all the was indicted in the Criminal Court
privileges and immunities of citi- of Baltimore for violating a statute
zens in the several States, Article
of Maryland by selling by sample
x, Io, forbidding any State with- in the city of Baltimore certain
out the consent of Congress to lay articles of merchandise without
obtaining a license so to do. By
duties on imports or exports, or to
the laws of Maryland, persons not
lay any duty of tonnage, and
I
permanent residents in the State
of the Fourteenth Amendment,
I Owing to the absence of Mr. Freedley, the editors alone are responsible for this annotation.
2 Reported in 21 S. W. Rep., 300.
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were prohibited from offering for
sale within a certain district of the
State any goods whatever other
than agricultural products and artides manufactured in the State,
either by card, sample or other
specimen, or by written or printed
trade list or catalogue, whether
such person bethe maker or manufacturer or not, without first obtaining a license so to do. Licenses
might be granted by the proper
authorities of the State for that
purpose on the payment of $3oo, to
run for one year from date. The
case came before the Court upon
an agreed statement of facts, showing a violation of the statute by
the defendant below, and that he
was at the time of the commission
of the offense and up to the trial a
citizen of the United States and of
the State of New Jersey and resident in said State. The facts so
agreed raised the single question
whether the Maryland statute was
invalid for repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States. In
the opinion of the Court reference
was made to the limitations on the
power of the several States to levy
taxes and also to the restraint imposed by the commerce clause of
the Constitution, but the decision
rested on the point that the statute
under consideration was repugnant
to the second section of Article 4
of the Constitution, Mr. Justice
CLIFFORD saying: "Attempt will
not be made to define the words
'privileges and immunities,' or to
specify the rights which they are
intended to secure and protect,
beyond what may be necessary to
the decision of the case before the
Court. Beyond doubt those words
are words of very comprehensive
meaning, but it will be sufficient to
say that the clause plainly and

unmistakably secures and protects
the right of a citizen of one State
to pass into any other State of the
Union for the purpose of engaging
in lawful commerce, trade or business, without molestation; to acquire personal property; to take
and hold real estate; to maintain
actions in"the courts of the State;
and to be exempt from any higher
taxes or excises than are imposed
by the State upon its own citizens:
Cooley, Const. Lim., I6; Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat., 449."
III Robbins v. Taxing District of
Shelby County, 120 U. S., 489, the
constitutionality of a Tennessee
statute, also directed against
foreign drummers, was passed upon
by the Court.. Evidently, with the
intent to avoid the objection raised
against the constitutionility of the
Maryland statute, this provided
that "All drummers and all persons not having a regular licensed
house of business in the taxing
district offering for sale or selling
goods, wares or merchandise therein by sample, shall be required to
pay to the county," etc. The
Court, however, held the statute to
be unconstitutional, as offending
against the commerce clause, declaring that a State cannot levy
a tax or impose any other restriction upon the inhabitants of other
States for selling or seeking to sell
their goods in such State before
they are introduced therein; that
the negotiation of sales of goods
which are in another State for the
purpose of introducing them into
the State in which the negotiation
is made, is interstate commerce;
that such commerce is not subject
to State taxation, even though
there be no distinction between it
and domestic commerce. A like
ruling was made in the State of
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Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S., 312,
where an attempt was made to put
a tax on the products of other
States by statute requiring as a
condition of sales in Minnesota of
fresh beef, veal, lamb or pork for
human food, that the animals from
which such meats are taken shall
have been inspected in Minnesota
before being slaughtered, the Court
saying, that "a burden imposed
by a State upon interstate commerce is not to be sustained simply
because the statute imposing it
applies alike to the people of all
the States, including the people of
the State enacting such statute."

THE RIGHT OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION To TRANSACT BusINEss
STATE.-Such being the safeguards which insure to a citizen of
IN A

the United States the right to carry
the various States of
on business ift
which he is not a resident, ve shall
now consider whether any such
rights are given to a foreign corporation. In the celebrated-case
of Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall., 168, it
was held that corporations are not
"citizens" within the meaning of
Article 4, 2 of the National Con-

stitution, declaring that "The citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States," and
this has been followed in the more
recent case of Pembina C. S. M. &
N. Co. v. Penna., 125 U. S., i8i.
That case upheld the constitutionality of an Act of Assembly of
the State of Pennsylvania providing that no foreign corporation,
except foreign insurance companies, which did not invest and
use its capital in that commonwealth, should have an office
therein for the use of its officers,
stockholders, agents or employees,
unless it should first .obt4in a

license so to do, for which it was
required to pay to the State Treasurer annually one-quarter of a
mill on the dollar of capital stock
which it was authorized to have.
The plaintiff in error was incorporated under the laws of Colorado
for the purpose of carrying on a
general miningandmillingbusiness
in that State, where it had its principal office. During the year 1881

it occupied an office in the city of
Philadelphia for the use of its
officers, stockholders, agents and"
employees, and was assessed for
office license under the act above
recited by the Auditor-General of
Pennsylvania. In its opinion the
Court said: "The only limitation
upon this power of the State to
exclude a foreign corporation from
doing business within its limits, or
hiring offices for that purpose, or to
exact conditions for allowing the
corporation to do business or hire
offices there, arises where the corporation is in. the employ of the
Federal Government, or where its
business is strictly commerce, interstate or foreign.' The control of
such commerce, being in the Federal Government, is not to be restricted by State authority."
While it was laid down as law in
Sante Clara Co. v. Southarn Pacific
Railway, 118 U. S., 394, that the
provision of the Fourteenth Ainendment of the Constitution of the
United States, which forbids.a State
to deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of
the law, applies to corporations,
yet, in Phila. Fire Association v.
New York, II9 U. S., Iio, it was
held -that this .piovision does not
prohibit a State from imposing
such conditions upon foreign.corporations as it may choose as a
condition of their admission within
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-

its limits, and that they cannot be
of right within such jurisdiction
until they receive the consent of
the State to their entrance therein.
* In so deciding, however, the court
was careful to add that it was not
to be implied from what was there
- said, "that the power of a State to
exclude a foreign corporation from
* doing business within its limits, is
to be regarded as extending to an
interference with the transaction of
commerce between that State and
-other States by a corporation
created by one of such other
States."
The suggestion there thrown out,
that corporations are within the
protection of the commerce clause
of the Constitution, had before been
asserted in Gloucester Ferry Co. v.
Pa., 114 U. S., 196, and was afterward exemplified in the cases of
McCaull v. California, 136 U. S.,
1o4; N. W. Ry. Co. v. Penna., 136
U. S., 114, and Crutcher v'. Kentucky, 141 U. S.; 47. In the lastmentioned case it was held that a
State la'v which forbids a corporation of another State from carrying
on its business of interstate commerce within the State without
taking out a license and paying a
license fee to the State is not an
exercise of the police power of the
State which is permissible -as
against the power of Congress to
regulate
interstate
commerce.
Neither licenses nor indirect taxation of any kind, nor any system
of State regulation can be imposed
upon interstate any more than
foreign commerce. It must, however, be borne in mind that the language used by the court is predicated of foreign corporations engaged in the business of transportation between different States, Mr.
Justice BRADLzY, who delivered

the opinion, saying: "The case is
entirely different from" that of
foreign corporations seeking to do
a business which does not belong to
the regulating power of Congress.
The insurance business, for example, cannot be carried on in a
State by a foreign corporation without complying with all the conditions imposed by the legislation of
thatState. So with regard to manufacturing corporations and all other
corporations whose business is of a
local and domestic nature, which
would include express companies,
whose business is confined to points
and places wholly within the State.
The cases to this effect are numerous: Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
38 U. S., 13 Pet. 519; Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U. S., 8 Wall., i68;
Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U. S., io' Wall., 566;
Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson,
113 U. S., 727; Phila. F. Asso. v.
New York, 119 U. S., iio." To
which list of cases may be added
the recent decision in Horn Silver
Mining Co. v. State of New York,
143 U. S., 314, where the court says
that this power of a State to exclude
foreign corporations or to impose
conditions upon which it permits
them to do business within its
limits is a doctrine "so frequently
declared by this court that it must
be deemed no longer a matter of
discussion if any question can ever
be considered at rest. Only two
exceptions or qualifications have
been attached to it in all the
numerous adjudications in which
the subject has been considered
since the judgment of this court
was announced more than a half
century ago in Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 38 U. S., 13 Pet., 51g.
One of these qualifications is that
the State cannot exclude from its
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limits a corporation engaged in the
interstate or foreign commerce established by the decision in Pensa-cola Teleg. Co. v. Western U.
Teleg. 'Co., 96 U. S., I, 12. The
other limitation on the power of
the State is where the corporation
is in the employ of the general
government, an obvious exception,
first stated, we think, by the late
Mr. Justice BRADLEY, in Stockton
v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. R. Co., 32
Fed. Rep., 9, 14. As that learned
Justice said: "If Congress should
employ a corporation of shipbuilders to construct a man-of-war,
they would have the right to purchase the necessary timber and iron
in any State of the Union." And
this court, in citing this passage,
added, "without the permission
and against the prohibition of the
State:" Pembina Con. S. Min. &
Mill- Co. 'v. Penna., 125 U. S., I8I,
z86."
Can it then be said that under
the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States a foreign corporation is entitled to the same
freedom in carrying on interstate
commerce as citizens of the several
States? Or, to put it in another
way, has the exact point decided
in the case at the head of this note
been passed on by the Supreme
Court of the United States? This
question cannot be answered unqualifiedly in the affirmative, although such a holding would seem
to be a logical necessity from what
has been explicitly decided. As
far back as 1884, in the case of
Gloucester. Ferry Co. v. Penna.,
114 U. S., 198, the Court, speaking
by

ir. Justice FIELD, said: "Nor

does it make any difference
whether such commerce is carried
on by individuals or by corporations: Welton [v. Missouri, 91 U.

S., 275; Mobile Co. v. Kimball,

U. S., 69.. As was said in Paul
v. Virginia, at the time of the
formation of the Constitution, a
large portion of the commerce of
the world was carried on by corporations; and the East India
Company, the Hudson's Bay Company, the Hamburgh Company,
the Levant Company and the Virginia Company were mentioned as
among the corporations which,
from the extent of their operations,
had become celebrated throughoutthe commercial world: 8 Wall, 168.
The grant of power is general in
its terms, making no reference to
the agencies by which commerce
may be cairied on. It includes
commerce by whomsoever conducted, whether by individuals or
by corporations. At the 'present
day nearly all enterprises of a commercial character requiring for
their successful management large'•
expenditures of money -are conducted by corporations. The usual
means of transportation on the
public waters .where expedition is
desired are vessels propelled b5y
steam; and the ownership of a
line of such vessels generally requires an expenditure exceeding
the resources -of single individuals.
vlExcept in rare instances, it is only
by associated capital furnished by
persons united in corporations, that
the requisite means are provided
for such expenditures."
This language was quoted with
approval in the subsequent case of
P. C. S. M. S. Co. v. Penna., 122
U. 8., 326.
The question then would seem to
resolve itself into the determination of whether the negotiation of
the sale of goods which are in
another State by a foreign corporation, for the purpose of introducing
102
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them into the State in which the
negotiation is made, is an act of
interstate commerce. We have
already seen, in the decisions of
Ward v. Maryland, and Robbins v.
Taxing District of Shelby County,
sufra, that when such acts are
done by individuals they are held
to constitute interstate commerce,
and it is. difficult to understand
how their character could change
in this respect.merely because the
vendor in one case was an individual and in the other a corporation. Nevertheless, it should be
borne in mind that in those cases
in which a corporation has been
held to be within the protection of
the commerce clause, such corporation has been actually engaged in
the transportation of messages,
goods or passengers between two or
more of the States, and-in the case
* of Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113
.'. U. S., 727, while two of the court
" put themselves on record as enter. taining the views set forth in the
S.-case
at the head of this note, yet
the majority of the court, not finding it necessary to base their decision on that point, declined to
express any opinion on the question
we are here considering. The facts
in that case were as follows: The
Act of the legislature of Colorado.
provided that foreign corporations
should file certain certificates with
the secretary of State as a condition
precedent to their doing business
therein, and that a failure to comply therewith should render the
officers, agents or stockholders of
such corporations
individually
liable on all its contracts 2Iiade
while the corporation was so in
default. These provisions of the
law of Colorado being in force,
the plaintiff in error, mhich was a
corporation organized under the

laws of Ohio, and having its principal place of business in that
State, entered into a con'tract within the State of Colorado with defendants, who are citizens thereof,
by which it agreed to sell and
deliver to them a steam engine and
other machinery for a stipulated
price. Suit was brought by plaintiff to recover damages for breach
of said contract. The defendants,
among other defences, pleaded that
when the contract was entered into
the plaintiff had not made and filed
the certificate required by the Act
aforesaid. To this answer plaintiff
demurred. The demurrer was overruled by a divided court, and the
plaintiff .electing to stand by its
demurrer, judgment was entered
against it, dismissing itp suit and
for costs, which judgment was
brought under review by the writ
of error in the case. From the
brief of counsel it may be inferred
that the unconstitutionality of the
Act, as offending against the commerce clause, was not urged by the
plaintiff in error, though touched
on in the opinion of the Court, the
contention being that the provisions of the Act in question applied only to corporations of other
States which came to Colorado
with the intention of carrying on
the business for which they were
incorporated, that any other interpretation would prevent single
transactions between foreign corporations and a citizen, and that
the performance of a single isolated
act, such as making of a single
contract, does not constitute doing
business within the State within
the meaning of such legal provisions as that of the Act under
consideration. This was also the
view taken by the majority of the
court, Mr. Justice WOODS, who
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delivered this opinion, saying:
" We base the conclusion that the
demurrer to the defendant's answer
should have been sustained upon
the interpretation we have given
to the Constitution and statute, and
do not find it necessary to decide
whether their provisions invade
the exclusive right of Congress to
regulate commerce among the
several States. We have examined
all the cases cited by the defendants to support their interpretation.
In none of them was the statute
construed similar in its language
or provisions to the Constitution
or statute under consideration, and
the cases can have no controlling
weight in the present controversy."
Mr. justice MXTTHEws and Mr.
Justice BLATCHFORD, however,
while concurring in the judgment
of the Court, took the ground that
whatever might be the construction
of the statute, the transaction in
question was an act of interstate
commerce, and that the State had
no power to prohibit a foreign corporation from selling in Colorado
by contract made there its machinery manufactured elsewhere.
Their opinion reads as follows:
"Mr. Justice MATTHEWS: Mr.
Justice BEATCHFORD and myself
concur in the judgment of the
Court announced in this case, but
on different grounds from those
stated in the opinion.
"Whatever power may be conceded to a State to prescribe conditions on which foreign corporations may transact business within
its limits, it cannot be admitted to
extend so far as to prohibit or regulate commerce among the States,
for that would be to invade the
jurisdiction which, by the terms
of the Constitution of the United

States, is conferred exclusively
upon Congress.
"In the present case the construction claimed for the Constitution
of Colorado, and the statute of
that State passed in execution of it,
cannot be extended to prevent the
plaintiff in error, a corporation of
another State, from transacting any
business in Colorado, which, of
itself, is commerce. The transaction in question was clearly of that
character. It was the making of a
contract in Colorado to manufacture certain machinery in Ohio, to
be there delivered for transportation to the purchasers in Colorado.
That was commerce, and to prohibit it, except upon conditions, is
to regulate commerce between Colorado and Ohio, which is within
the exclusive province of Congress..
It is quite competent, no doubt, for
Colorado to prohibit a foreign cor-"
poration from acquiring a domicile
in that State, and to prohibit it
from carrying on within that State
its business of manufacturing machinery. But it cannot prohibit it
from selling in" Colorado, by contracts made there, its machinery
manufactured elsewhere, for that
would be to regulate commerce
among the States.
"In Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall.,
168, the issuing of a policy of insurance was expressly held not to
be a transaction of commerce, and,
therefore, not excluded from the
control of State laws, and the decision in that case is predicated upon
that distinction. It is, therefore,
not inconsistent with these views."
In view of this case one can
hardly say with certainty that
when the question shall arise for
decision by the Supreme Court of
the United States the ruling of a
majority of the members will be to
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-the same effect as that of Ift. Justice
r unws and Mr. Justice

posed by the statutes of the
States in which the .contracts
BLATCHFORD in the opinion just are made, are held to be void.
quoted, but for reasons already And this even where the statutes
given such would seem to be the do not expressly so provide, on the
only logical outcome of the cases ground that whenever an act is
o
we have reviewed. The Views ex- made subject to a penalty by a statpressed by the Justices mentioned ute it is considered as prohibited
have been followed in Ware v. and void: Ins. Co. z. Slaughter, 20,
*Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. (S. C., Ind., 520; Cincinnati M. H. A. Co.
Ala.), 9 So. Rep., 136; Mfg. Co. v. v. Rosenthal, 55 Ill., 85; Ins. Co.
Hardie (N. M.), I6 Pac. Rep., 136. v. Pursell, io Allen, 232; Roche v.
DoES A SINGLE TRANSACTION Ladd, I Allen, 441; Thorne v. Ins.
CONSTITUTE
DOING
BUSINESs Co., 8o Pa., IS; Bank v. Page, 6
Oreg., 431; In re Comstock, 3
WITHIN THE MEANING OF SUCH
Sawy., 218: Semnple v. Bank BHtish
STATUTES? -While
the wording
of the statutes in the different Columbia, 5 Sawy., 88.
I States varies somewhat, and the
On the other hand, it has been
difference in wording may affect held that where a penalty is prethe determination of this ques- scribed for failure to comply with
tion, roughly speaking' an affir- the requirements of such statute
• mative, answer has been given in the contracts of a foreign corporathe following cases: Is re Com- tion which has not complied therestock, 3 Sawy., 218; Bank v. Page, with are not void, as the penalty
6 Ore., 431; Thorne z. Ins. Co., 8o prescribed is exclusive of all other:
Pa., 15 (orpare Campbell Co. v.
Ehrman v. Teutonia Ins. Co., I.
Hering, 139 Pa., 473); Roche v. McCrary, 123; Columbus Ins. Co.,
v. Walsh, 18 M o., 229; Clark v.
Ladd.', I Allen, 44I; Ins. Co. v.
Slaughter, 20 Ind., 520; Ins. Co. v.
Middleton, 19 Mo., 53; Brooklyn
Pursell, ib Allen, 231; Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Bledore, 52 Ala.,
H. & M. Ins. Co. v. Rosenthal, 55 538; Union M ut. Life Ins. Co. v.
IIl., 85; Ins. Co. v. Harvey, ii Wis., McMillan, 24 Ohio St., 67; King
412; Farrior v. New Bngland Mort- v. National M. & E. Co., 4 Mo., I;
gage Security Co., 8&Ala., 275.
Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 33 West
While the contrary has been held Va., 566.
in Potter v. Bank, 5 Hill, 491; GraBut even though the contract
ham v. Hendricks, 22 La. Ann., thus made may be void, so that an
action based upon it could not be
523; Suydam v. Morris C. & B.
Co., 6 Hell., 217; Nay. Co. v. Weed, maintained, yet suit without reference to the contract may be had
17 Barb., 378; Gilchrist v. Helena
H. S. & R. Co., 47 F., 593; Colorado for benefits conferred: Morawetz
R4wy. Works v. Sierra Grande Min- on Corporations, 2d ed., 721, and
ing Co., i5 Colo., 499; Cooper Mfg. cases there cited; Brice Ultra Vires,
Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S., 727.
2d ed., 796; Holmes v. Barnard, I5
W. N. C. (Pa.), ho; Thorne v.
EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH SAID LAwS.-In some of Travellers' Ins. Co., 8o Pa., 15.
And it does not follow that bethe States all contracts made by
foreign corporations, before com- cause such contract is treated as
plying with the conditions in- void in the State where it was made

